Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets by Carmen M. Reinhart & Vincent Raymond Reinhart
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets
Volume Author/Editor: Sebastian Edwards and Jeffrey A.
Frankel, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-18494-3
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/edwa02-2
Conference Date: January 2001
Publication Date: January 2002
Title: What Hurts Emerging Markets Most? G3 Exchange
Rate or Interest Rate Volatility?
Author: Carmen M. Reinhart, Vincent Raymond Reinhart
URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10635133
3.1 Introduction
Although fashions concerning appropriate exchange rate arrangements
have shifted over the years, advocacy for establishing a target zone sur-
rounding the world’s three major currencies has remained a hardy peren-
nial. Work on target zones (pioneered by McKinnon 1984, 1997, and
Williamson 1986, and recently summarized by Clarida 2000) has mostly
emphasized the beneﬁts of exchange rate stability for industrial countries.
More recently, though, analysts have apportioned some of the blame for ﬁ-
nancial crises in emerging markets back to the volatile bilateral exchange
rates of industrial countries (as in the dissenting opinions registered in
Goldstein 1999, for instance). With many emerging-market currencies tied
to the U.S. dollar either implicitly or explicitly, movement in the exchange
values of the currencies of major countries—in particular the prolonged
appreciation of the U.S. dollar in relation to the yen and the deutsche Mark
in advance of Asia’s troubles—is argued to have worsened the competitive
position of many emerging market economies. One method for reducing
destabilizing shocks emanating from abroad, the argument runs, would be
to reduce the variability of the Group of Three (G3) currencies by estab-
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Carmen M. Reinhart and Vincent Raymond Reinhartlishing target bands.1 This paper examines the argument for such a target
zone strictly from an emerging-market perspective and will be silent on the
costs and beneﬁts for industrial countries.2
Given the reality that sterilized intervention by industrial economies
tends to be ineﬀective and that policy makers show no inclination to return
to the kinds of controls on international capital ﬂows that helped keep ex-
change rates stable over the Bretton Woods era, a commitment to damping
G3 exchange rate ﬂuctuations requires a willingness on the part of G3 au-
thorities to use domestic monetary policy to that end. This, in turn, may re-
quire tolerating more variability in interest rates and, potentially, spending.
Under a system of target zones, then, relative prices for emerging-market
economies may become more stable in an environment of predictable G3
exchange rates, but greater interest rate volatility may make debt-servicing
costs less predictable, and greater G3 income volatility may render demands
for the products of emerging-market economies more uncertain. The wel-
fare consequences to an emerging-market economy, therefore, are ambigu-
ous, depending on initial conditions, the speciﬁcation of behavior, and the
dynamic nature of the trade-oﬀ between lower G3 exchange rate volatility
and higher G3 interest rate variability.
The consequences for the developing South of interest rate, exchange
rate, and income volatility in the North comprise only one part of myriad
North-South links. Consequently, issues related to G3 exchange rate vari-
ability should be viewed within the much larger context (and related liter-
ature) of the inﬂuence of economic outcomes in developed countries on
those in less developed economies. In this paper, we review and revisit the
“traditional” North-South links via trade, commodity markets, and capital
ﬂows, and add transmission channels in the form of interest rate and ex-
change rate volatilities.
In section 3.2, we discuss the various channels of North-South transmis-
sion and use the example of a simple trade model to establish that, for a
small open economy with outstanding debt, the welfare eﬀect of damping
variations in the exchange rate by making international interest rates more
volatile is ambiguous. Section 3.3 presents stylized evidence on how the
monetary policy and economic cycle in the United States inﬂuence capital
ﬂows to emerging markets as well as growth. In section 3.4, we ﬁrst exam-
ine the contribution of G3 exchange rate volatility to ﬂuctuations in the ex-
change rates of emerging markets and proceed to analyze the link between
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1. Of course, since European monetary union, the G3 currencies cover at least fourteen in-
dustrial countries—the United States, Japan, and the twelve nations that have adopted the
euro. In what follows, we splice together the pre–single currency data on the deutsche Mark
with the post-1999 data on the exchange value of the euro.
2. For a cost-beneﬁt analysis from a developed country’s perspective on the eﬀects of limit-
ing G3 exchange rate volatility or adopting a common currency, see Rogoﬀ (2001). Of partic-
ular relevance here is Rogoﬀ’s argument that the strongest case for stabilizing major currency
exchange rates may well rest in the way that their volatility inﬂuences developing countries.G3 interest rate and exchange rate volatility and capital ﬂows and economic
growth in developing countries. The ﬁnal section summarizes our main
ﬁndings and discusses some of the policy implications of our analysis.
3.2 North-South Links
In this section, we discuss the various channels through which economic
developments in the major developed economies can potentially aﬀect de-
veloping countries. On the developed side, we examine how the exchange
rate arrangements among industrial countries inﬂuence the mix of interest
rate and exchange rate volatility on world ﬁnancial markets. On the emerg-
ing markets side, our focus is on capital ﬂows—their level and composi-
tion—and on economic performance, as measured by gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) growth.
3.2.1 The Winds from the North: The Role of G3 
Exchange Rate Arrangements in Determining the Mix 
of Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Volatilities
In principle, G3 exchange rates could be induced to stay within a target
band through some combination of three tools. First, national authorities
could rely on sterilized intervention to enforce some corridor on bilateral
exchange rates. However, except to the extent that such intervention tends
to signal future changes in domestic monetary policy, researchers have
found little empirical support that sterilized intervention in industrial coun-
tries is eﬀective.3 Second, national authorities could impose some form of
exchange or capital control, presumably in the form of a transactions tax or
prudential reserve requirements. Opponents of such eﬀorts generally argue
that capital controls generate ﬁnancial innovation that undercuts them over
time, implying that the controls become either increasingly complicated or
irrelevant. Third, monetary policy makers in the major countries could al-
ter domestic market conditions to keep the foreign exchange value of their
currencies in a desired range. This could take the form of allowing inter-
vention in the currency market to aﬀect domestic reserves—that is, not ster-
ilizing intervention—or more directly keying the domestic policy interest
rate to the exchange value of the currency (as discussed in McKinnon 1997
and Williamson 1986).
Given the lack of evidence of any independent eﬀect of sterilized inter-
vention (over and beyond what subsequently happens to domestic mone-
tary policy), and given the consensus supporting the free international mo-
bility of capital, it would seem that the only instrument available to enforce
a target zone would be the domestic monetary policy of the G3 central
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3. The signaling channel is addressed by Kaminsky and Lewis (1996); Dominguez and
Frankel (1993) examine whether there are any portfolio eﬀects of sterilized intervention.banks. However, this implies some trade-oﬀ, in that G3 domestic short-
term interest rates would have to become more variable to make G3 ex-
change rates smoother.
The nature of this trade-oﬀ, of course, depends on many factors, partic-
ularly the width of the target zone. Wider bands would presumably reduce
the need of G3 central banks to move their interest rates in response to ex-
change rate changes. At the same time, however, wider bands would imply
a smaller reduction in the volatility of G3 exchange rates.4 In addition, G3
interest rates might not be all that is aﬀected by the exchange rate policy.
Central bank actions taken to damp G3 exchange rate volatility might also
leave their imprint on income in the G3 countries. Wider swings in indus-
trial country interest rates would presumably make spending in those coun-
tries more variable, even as the split of that spending on domestic versus for-
eign goods and services becomes more predictable under more stable G3
exchange rates.
To understand the eﬀects of these trade-oﬀs from an emerging-markets
perspective, it is important to remember that most developing countries are
net debtors to the industrial world and that typically that debt is short-term
and denominated in one of the G3 currencies. As a result, the welfare con-
sequences for an emerging-market economy of G3 target zones depend on
exactly how those zones are enforced and the particulars of the small coun-
try’s mix of output, trading partners, and debt structure.
3.2.2 A Stylized Model of an Emerging Market Economy
The eﬀects of trading interest rate for exchange rate volatility can be seen
in a basic single-period, two-good model of trade for a small open economy,
as in ﬁgure 3.1. This ﬁgure represents a country that takes as given the rel-
ative price of the two traded goods and receives an endowment in terms of
good A. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that its external debt is also
denominated in terms of good A and its currency is pegged to that of coun-
try A.5 Volatility of the relative price of the traded goods—which might
stem solely from nominal changes in exchange rates between the industrial
countries if the small country ﬁxes its exchange rate or if it prices to the in-
dustrial country market—pivots the budget line and thus alters the desired
consumption combination in the small country. Suppose, for instance, that
the currency of country A depreciates relative to that of country B, rotating
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4. Some might argue that if G3 target zones anchor inﬂation expectations in developed
countries, both exchange rates andinterest rates could become more stable. However, many in-
dustrial countries in the past decade have adopted some form of inﬂation targeting, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, which has worked to stabilize inﬂation expectations and which would
make achieving a credibility bonus from adopting a G3 target zone less likely.
5. Behind the scenes of this model in the larger industrial world, it is simplest to think of two
large countries, A and B, specialized in the production of their namesake good. The net eﬀect
of our assumption about the small economy’s endowment and debt structure is that the inter-
cept of the budget line depends on the interest rate in country A.the budget line from EF to GF. All else being equal, welfare would decline,
representing a cost associated with developments on the foreign exchange
market for this small country.
Target zones for the large countries, if eﬀective, would be able to prevent
the budget line from rotating as the result of inﬂuences emanating from the
developed world. However,  this reduced major-country exchange rate
volatility will only be accomplished if the major central banks change short-
term interest rates in response to incipient changes in cross rates. For most
emerging-market economies, which are debtors, such coordination of G3
monetary policy could deliver more stable terms of trade at the expense of
a more variable interest service. In this particular case, the central bank of
country A would presumably have to raise its domestic short-term interest
rate in defense of the currency. Thus, while the slope of the budget line
would be unchanged, its location would shift inward, as labeled HI. Re-
gardless of whether the eﬀects of the initial shock were felt through the ex-
change rate of the interest rate, welfare in this small country would decline.
The degree to which it declines if the large countries allow the cross-
exchange rate or their interest rates to adjust will depend on many factors.
3.2.3 Going Beyond the Stylized Model
In reality, many developing countries send primary commodities onto
the world market, there is some substitutability in world demand for those
countries that produce manufactured products, and capital markets are far
from perfect. In this section, we review the literature on North-South link-
ages to broaden our understanding of the issues related to G3 exchange rate
arrangements.
As opposed to the simple example, most emerging-market economies
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Fig. 3.1 Welfare in a small open economyface some slope to the demand curve for their exports. As a result, any
changes in G3 income induced by changes in their interest rates will be re-
ﬂected in the demand for the exports of their trading partners to the extent
that imports in the developed economy have a positive income elasticity.6
The higher the share of exports that are destined for the developed country,
the more sizable the consequences for the emerging-market economy. On
the basis of this channel, for example, Mexico and Canada would be
aﬀected far more than Argentina by an economic downturn in the United
States. We see evidence of this in the fact that in 1999 about 88 percent of
all Canadian and Mexican exports were shipped to the U.S. market,
whereas only about 11 percent of Argentina’s exports were destined for the
United States.7Other things being equal, the higher the income elasticity of
imports in the developed country, the more pronounced will be the con-
traction in the country’s exports when the developed country slows. In this
regard, developing countries that export predominantly manufactured
goods (which typically are more sensitive to income) may fare worse than
their counterparts exporting primary commodities, which tend to be rela-
tively income-inelastic.8 The heterogeneity in export structure across devel-
oping countries is suﬃciently signiﬁcant to expect, a priori, highly diﬀeren-
tiated outcomes. For instance, the contrast between the export structure of
East Asian countries (which are heavily skewed to manufactured goods) to
that of most African countries (which are predominantly skewed to pri-
mary commodities) is particularly striking.9
As opposed to the simple example, emerging-market economies gener-
ally produce a diﬀerent mix of goods from those of industrial countries. In
that case, the business cycle in the world’s largest economies may itself ex-
ert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the terms of trade of their smaller, developing
trading partners. Perhaps the clearest example of such a North-South link
comes from international commodity markets, as argued in Dornbusch
(1985). Beginning with that work, the literature on commodity price de-
termination has consistently accorded a signiﬁcant role to the growth per-
formance of the major industrial countries.10 In particular, recessions in
industrial economies, especially the United States, have historically been
associated with weakness in real commodity prices. In our simple example,
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6. Note that this channel, as it relies on the behavior of the large partner, is present irre-
spective of the level of development of the smaller trading partners.
7. The stylized evidence on patterns of trade is discussed in the next session.
8. See, for example, Reinhart (1995), who estimates industrial countries’ import demand
function for various regions and countries with varying degrees of export diversiﬁcation and
primary commodity content.
9. For example, manufactures account for only 10 percent in the Côte D’Ivoire (the Ivory
Coast) but account for more than 65 percent of Thai exports.
10. Dornbusch (1985) stresses the role of the demand side in commodity price determina-
tion. Borensztein and Reinhart (1994), who incorporate supply-side developments in their
analysis, also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive relationship between growth in the major
economies and world commodity prices.if the small country’s endowment was made up of a commodity, the eﬀects
of G3 monetary policy actions on overall demand for those primary goods
could induce a sizable shift in the position and rotation of the budget line.
Yet the impact of ﬂuctuations in the business cycle on developing
economies is probably not limited merely to income and relative price
eﬀects. There is a well-established, endogenous, and countercyclical “mon-
etary policy cycle” in the major developed economies. To damp the ampli-
tude of the business cycle, central banks ease monetary conditions and re-
duce interest rates during economic downturns and hike interest rates when
signs of overheating develop. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) stress
the importance of U.S. interest rates in driving the international capital ﬂow
cycle. They present evidence that, in periods of low interest rates in the
United States, central banks in developing countries in Latin America sys-
tematically accumulate foreign exchange reserves and the real exchange
rate appreciates. Subsequent studies that examined net capital ﬂows, ex-
tending the analysis to a variety of their components over various sample
periods and to developing countries in other regions, found similar evi-
dence.
This link between the interest rate and capital ﬂow cycle may arise for a
variety of reasons. Investors in the developed economies faced with lower
interest rates may be inclined to seek higher returns elsewhere (i.e., the de-
mand for developing country assets increases). It also may be the case that
the decline in international interest rates makes borrowing less costly for
emerging markets and increases the supply of emerging-market debt. In
that case, the decline in the cost of borrowing for emerging-market coun-
tries may be even greater than the decline in international interest rates if
the country risk premium is itself a positive function of international inter-
est rates. The evidence presented in Fernandez-Arias (1996), Frankel,
Schmukler, and Servén (2001), and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) sup-
port the notion that country-risk premiums in many emerging markets in-
deed move with international interest rates in a manner that ampliﬁes the
interest rate cycle of industrial countries. Thus, a change in G3 interest rates
shifts the budget line by more than is shown in our simple example, as pro-
cyclical capital ﬂows imply that the change in the industrial country inter-
est rate changes the developing country’s interest rate risk premium in the
same direction. Moreover, one could posit nonlinearities in the response if
large increases in borrowing costs—from balance-sheet strains and credit
rationing—have more substantial eﬀects on income prospects than do sim-
ilar size reductions in borrowing costs.
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the channels of transmission of how
developments in the major industrial countries may inﬂuence growth in
emerging markets. Taken together, the various cells of the table would sug-
gest that the trade and ﬁnance eﬀects that arise in developed economies
from the growth and interest rate cycles, respectively, tend to at least par-
What Hurts Emerging Markets Most? 139tially oﬀset one another. However, G3 exchange rate and interest rate
volatility would seem a priori to have a negative eﬀect on economic growth
in the developing world. Higher interest rate volatility may hamper invest-
ment, while higher G3 exchange rate volatility may retard emerging market
trade.11While the literature on the impacts on trade of exchange rate volatil-
ity for developed economies is inconclusive, the comparable analysis of this
issue for emerging markets seems much more convincing in concluding that
exchange rate volatility tends to reduce trade.
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Table 3.1 Developed and Developing Country Links
Expected Growth 
Type of Shock Transmission Channel Ampliﬁers Consequences
The Growth Cycle: Recessions in the G3
Income effects Trade: Lower exports to G3;  High trade exposure;  Negative
negative high G3 income elasti-
cities
Relative price effects Trade: Decline in the terms  High primary commo- Negative
of trade for developing  dity content in exports; 
countries high exposure to cycli-
cal industries in exports
International capital  Finance: Higher capital ﬂows Large declines in the  Positive
ﬂows (primarily bank lending) to  domestic demand for 
emerging markets bank loans
The Interest Rate Cycle: Monetary Easings
International capital  Finance: Higher portfolio  Developed bond and  Positive
ﬂows capital ﬂows to emerging  equity markets; high in-
markets terest rate sensitivity 
of ﬂows
Debt servicing Finance: Lower cost High levels of debt;  Positive
sensitive risk premiums 
to international interest 
rates
Interest earnings Finance: Declining interest  High level of reserves  Not obvious
income relative to debt
High Volatility in G3
Interest rates Finance: Complicates debt  High levels of short- Not obvious
management term debt; large new 
Investment: Uncertainty  ﬁnancing needs; an
tends to reduce investment   initially high level of  Negative
consequences FDI
Bilateral exchange  Trade: Reduces trade Pegging to a G3  Negative?
rate currency
11. Of course, G3 interest rate volatility may also complicate signiﬁcantly emerging market
debt management strategies or make systemic strains more likely.3.3 The Role of the North’s Business and Monetary Policy Cycles: 
The Stylized Facts
In this section, we present stylized evidence on the North-South links
that were discussed in the preceding section. For emerging markets, we ex-
amine international capital ﬂows and growth around various measures of
the U.S. growth and interest rate cycle and contrast periods of high inter-
est rate and exchange rate volatility to those in which volatility was rela-
tively subdued. We present evidence of the direction of North-South trade
and on the impact of G3 developments on international commodity mar-
kets.
Our data are annual and span the years 1970 to 1999, and the country
groupings are those reported in the International Monetary Fund’s World
Economic Outlook (WEO).12 For capital ﬂows, these groupings include all
emerging markets, Africa, Asia crisis countries, other Asian emerging mar-
kets, the Middle East and Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. In report-
ing aggregate real GDP, the WEO groups the Asian countries somewhat
diﬀerently. The two reported subgroupings are Asia and newly industrial-
ized Asia, but all other categories remain the same. We examine the cyclical
behavior of net private capital ﬂow and its components: net private direct
investment (i.e., foreign direct investment [FDI]), private portfolio invest-
ment (PI), other net private capital ﬂow (OCF)—which is heavily weighted
toward bank lending—and net oﬃcial ﬂow (OFF).
3.3.1 The Growth Cycle, Capital Flows, and Emerging Market Growth
Given its prominent position in the world economy, the U.S. business
cycle (not surprisingly) has important repercussions for the rest of the
world. Economic developments in the United States echo loudly in many
developed economies, most notably that of Canada; the same holds true for
developing economies, especially those in the Western Hemisphere and
newly industrialized Asia. To examine the behavior of growth and various
types of capital ﬂows to emerging markets, we ﬁrst split the sample into two
states of nature according to two criteria. The ﬁrst parsing separates the
sample into recessions and expansions according to the National Bureau of
Economic Research’s dating of U.S. business cycle turning points. The sec-
ond cut of the data divides the sample into periods in which U.S. real GDP
growth is above the median growth rate for the sample and periods in which
growth is below the median.
Figure 3.2 depicts capital ﬂows to emerging markets (in billions of 1970
U.S. dollars) in recession years versus recovery years for the 1970–99 pe-
riod. As is evident, net ﬂows to emerging markets are considerably larger in
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12. The developing country classiﬁcation in the WEO is comprised of 128 countries. See the
WEO for details on the regional breakdown.F
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.real terms when the United States is in expansion than when the United
States is in recession. Furthermore, this gap between recession and expan-
sion owes itself primarily to a surge in FDI ﬂows (which increase almost
threefold from recession to expansion) and to portfolio ﬂows (which in-
crease almost ﬁvefold from recession to expansion). The key oﬀsetting cat-
egory is other net inﬂows to emerging markets, which evaporate when the
United States is in an expansion rather than recession. This disparate be-
havior between FDI and portfolio ﬂows is primarily due to bank lending,
which accounts for a signiﬁcant part of other ﬂows. Apparently, banks tend
to seek lending opportunities abroad when the domestic demand for loans
weakens and interest rates fall, as usually occur during recessions. The U.S.
bank lending boom to Latin America in the late 1970s and early 1980s and
the surge in Japanese bank lending to emerging Asia in the mid-1990s are
two clear examples of this phenomenon.
However, the surge in FDI ﬂows from the mid-1990s to the present is a
signiﬁcant departure from FDI’s historical behavior, which is, no doubt,
heavily inﬂuenced by the wave of privatization and mergers and acquisi-
tions that took place in many emerging markets during recent years. It is
possible that because this period of privatizations and surging FDI coin-
cides with the longest economic expansion in U.S. history, the results may
imply an exaggerated role for U.S. growth in driving FDI and total net ﬂows.
When we ended our sample in 1992, capital ﬂows to emerging markets still
diminished during economic downturns in the United States (this exercise
is not reproduced here). While FDI ﬂows and portfolio ﬂows continue to be
higher in expansions than in recessions, the drop in other ﬂows during ex-
pansions more than oﬀsets this tendency.
In sum, from the vantage point of the volume of capital ﬂows to emerg-
ing markets, U.S. recessions are not a bad thing. From a compositional
standpoint, however, the more stable component of capital ﬂows, FDI, does
seem to contract during downturns, suggesting that emerging markets may
wind up during these periods relying more heavily on less stable sources of
ﬁnancing—short-term ﬂows.13
The analogous exercise was performed for emerging-market average
annual GDP growth. As shown in table 3.2, for all developing countries,
growth is somewhat slower during U.S. recessions, averaging 4.8 percent
per annum versus 5.2 percent average growth during expansion years. How-
ever, the pattern is uneven across regions. For the countries in transition,
Asia (including the newly industrialized economies), and the Middle East
and Europe, growth tends to slow during U.S. recessions, while the oppo-
site is true for Africa and the Western Hemisphere. However, in most in-
stances the diﬀerences across regions are not markedly diﬀerent—an issue
we will explore further later.
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13. Other ﬂows are mostly short term.3.3.2 The Growth Cycle and Trade
If economic downturns in the United States are not necessarily bad for
the availability of international lending to emerging markets, slowdowns
are likely to have adverse consequences for countries that rely heavily on ex-
ports to the United States. Table 3.3 reports the percentage of total exports
(as of 1999) of various emerging markets in Africa, Asia, and the Western
Hemisphere that are destined for the U.S. market. It is evident that bilateral
trade links between the United States and the developing world are
strongest for Latin America, although there is considerable variation within
the region, with Mexico and Argentina sitting at the opposite ends of the
spectrum. However, trade between the United States and the Asian coun-
tries shown in this table is by no means trivial, especially if one considers
that (as shown in table 3.4) the income elasticity in developed economies for
Asian exports is typically estimated to be more than twice as large as the in-
come elasticity for African exports; more generally, the income elasticity of
the exports of developing countries that are major exporters of manufac-
tured goods is well above that of those countries whose exports have a
higher primary commodity content.
As noted earlier, swings in the economic cycle in the United States and
other major industrialized economies typically inﬂuence the terms of trade
of primary-commodity exporters. According to the various studies re-
viewed in table 3.5, a 1 percentage point drop in industrial production
growth in the developed economies results in a drop in real commodity
prices of roughly 0.77 to about 2.00 percent, depending on the study.
3.3.3 The Interest Rate–Monetary Policy cycle
In a world of countercyclical monetary policy in industrial countries, an
economic cycle goes hand in hand with an interest rate cycle. As with the
144 Carmen M. Reinhart and Vincent Raymond Reinhart
Table 3.2 The Condition of the U.S. Economy and Foreign Real GDP Growth: 
Annual Rate (%) 1970–99
Condition of U.S.
Monetary Policy: Condition of U.S. Economy:
Region/Country Expansion Recession Tightening Easing
Newly industrialized 
Asian economies 7.92 7.11 8.79 6.93
Developing countries 5.19 4.82 5.17 5.02
Africa 2.75 3.29 2.63 3.10
Asia 6.70 6.25 6.72 6.46
Middle East and Europe 4.47 4.31 3.87 4.80
Western Hemisphere 3.63 3.81 4.21 3.34
Source: Authors’ calculations using International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (October
2000).Table 3.3 North-South Trade Patterns, 1999
Exports to the U.S. Imports from the U.S.
Region/Country (% of Total Exports) (% of Total Imports)
Latin America
Argentina 11.3 19.6
Brazil 22.5 23.8
Chile 19.4 22.9
Colombia 50.3 32.1
Peru 29.3 31.6
Mexico 88.3 74.1
Venezuela 55.4 42.0
Asia
China Mainland 21.5 11.8
Indonesia 16.1 7.3
Korea 20.6 20.8
Malaysia 21.9 17.4
Philippines 29.6 20.3
Singapore 19.2 17.1
Thailand 21.5 11.5
Africa
Chad 7.2 2.1
Congo, Republic of 19.0 3.5
Ethiopia 8.4 4.9
Kenya 4.6 6.7
Mozambique 4.8 3.7
South Africa 8.2 13.3
Uganda 5.4 3.3
Zimbabwe 5.8 4.8
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics (2000).
Table 3.4 Industrial Country Demand for Developing Country Exports
Income
Study and Sample Importing Country Exporting Country Elasticity
Dornbusch (1985),  Major exporters of manufactures All non–oil-developing 1.74
1960 to 1983
Marquez (1990) Canada Non–OPEC-developing 2.83
Germany Non–OPEC-developing 2.29
Japan Non–OPEC-developing 1.22
United Kingdom Non–OPEC-developing 1.45
United States Non–OPEC-developing 3.04
Rest of OECD Non–OPEC-developing 2.61
Reinhart (1995),  All developed All developing 2.05
1970 to 1991 Africa 1.28
Asia 2.49
Latin America 2.07growth cycle, we proceed to describe the stylized evidence by breaking up
the sample in two ways. First, we subdivide the 1970–99 sample into two
subsamples, periods in which monetary policy was easing—that is, the mon-
etary policy interest rate in the United States, the federal funds rate, was de-
clining—and periods of tightening, when the federal funds rate was rising.14
Figure 3.3 reports the results of this exercise. In years when U.S. mone-
tary policy was easing, emerging markets in all regions (with the exception
of Africa, which is almost entirely shut out of international capital markets)
receive a markedly higher volume of capital inﬂows. While FDI and port-
folio ﬂows do not change much, other (short-term) ﬂows respond markedly
to the interest rate cycle. As shown in the third and fourth columns of table
3.2, average annual GDP growth rates are generally lower during easings of
U.S. monetary policy than during tightening episodes—which may simply
attest to the fact that Federal Reserve easings most often coincide with a
U.S. economic slowdown. This tendency may also suggest that, to the extent
that capital inﬂows have positive consequences for economic activity (an
important issue that has not received much attention in the literature), these
eﬀects may not be contemporaneous.
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14. More speciﬁcally, a year was denoted as one of tightening (easing) if the average level of
the federal funds rate in December was higher (lower) than that of twelve months earlier. Rec-
ognize that this cut of the data does not discriminate between modest and marked policy
changes: A 50 basis point drop in the federal funds rate during a given year would be lumped
together with a 400 basis point drop. To get at this issue, we also broke the sample into periods
when real interest rates are above the sample median and periods in which rates are below the
median. (Real ex post interest rates are calculated as the nominal yield on a three-month trea-
sury bill less the annual consumer price inﬂation rate.) Those results, which are not reported
here due to consideration of space, approximate those in the main text.
Table 3.5 Commodity Prices and Economic Cycles: A Review
Dependent Measure of Developed-
Study Variable/Sample Period Country Growth Rate Used Coefﬁcient
Borensztein and  All commodity index/ Industrial production for  1.40
Reinhart (1994) 1971:1–1992:3, quarterly developed economies
All commodity index/ Industrial production for  1.54
1971:1–1992:3, quarterly developed economies plus 
GDP for the former Soviet 
Union
Chu and Morrison (1984) All commodity index/ GDP weighted industrial  1.66
1958–82, quarterly production-G7 countries
Dornbusch (1985) All commodity index/ OECD industrial  2.07
1970:2–1985:1, quarterly production
Holtham (1988) All commodity index/ GDP growth for the G7  0.51
1967:2–1982:2, semiannual economies
Industrial production for 
the G7 economies 0.77F
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.3.3.4 Stylized Evidence on the Twin Cycles
Given the synchronization of the economic growth and policy cycles, a
ﬁner reading of the data is probably warranted. Table 3.6divides the sample
into four states of nature for the United States: recession accompanied by
monetary policy tightening; recession accompanied by easing; expansion
and tightening; and expansion and monetary policy easing. The role of the
business cycle is quite evident in the results. The worst outcome for emerg-
ing markets occurs when the United States is in a deep enough recession
that monetary policy is being systematically eased (the upper left cell in
each regional entry). In general, entries along the minor diagonal—repre-
senting either an expansion facilitated by policy easing or a U.S. economy
weak enough to be in recession but not so weak as to preclude Federal Re-
serve tightening—contain fast rates of growth in economic activity. The
fastest rates of growth are invariably recorded in the lower right cell, which
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Table 3.6 Emerging Market Economies and U.S. Economic and Policy Cycles
Condition of U.S.
Monetary Policy
Condition of
U.S. Economy Easing Tightening
Real GDP Growtha
Region/country
Newly industrialized Asian economies Recession 6.81 8.16
Expansion 7.01 8.92
Asia Recession 6.02 7.07
Expansion 6.75 6.65
Developing countries Recession 4.44 6.13
Expansion 5.39 4.98
Western Hemisphere Recession 2.78 7.41
Expansion 3.69 3.57
Net Private Capital Flowsb
Source of capital
Net private capital ﬂows Recession 13.86 8.58
Expansion 19.35 13.21
Net private portfolio investment Recession 1.48 0.19
Expansion 6.61 3.95
Net private direct investment Recession 4.24 3.42
Expansion 11.50 11.03
Other net private capital ﬂows Recession 8.38 4.98
Expansion 1.24 –1.78
Source: Authors’ calculations using International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
(October 2000).
aAverage annual real GDP growth, percent.
bAverage, billions $1970.includes those years in which the U.S. economy is expanding and monetary
policy tightening. That is, foreign economies historically grow the fastest in
the latter stages of the U.S. business cycle when fast U.S. growth is creating
pressures on resources that trigger Federal Reserve tightening.
As to capital ﬂows, the priors are less well deﬁned. On the one hand, the
Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) hypothesis would suggest that, other
things being equal, tighter monetary policy (i.e., rising interest rates) would
lead to lower capital ﬂows to emerging markets. On the other hand, while re-
cessions in the North may dampen FDI ﬂows (as these are often linked to
trade), economic slowdowns tend to be accompanied by a weakening in the
domestic demand for loans—which, in the past, has often led banks to seek
lending opportunities abroad (see Kaminsky and Reinhart 2001).
The lower panel of table 3.6 presents net capital ﬂows and its components
to all emerging markets during these four states of nature. For net private
ﬂows, the largest entry falls in the lower left cell, suggesting that both lower
interest rates and faster growth in the United States are potential catalysts
for capital ﬂows into emerging markets. However, this feature is not consis-
tent across categories: FDI and portfolio ﬂows thrive when expansions are
coupled with falling interest rates, but other ﬂows, which are largely com-
posed of bank lending, do not. Like other ﬂows, these tend to increase in pe-
riods of falling interest rates but contract during expansions; other ﬂows are
highest when the United States is in recession and interest rates are falling.
3.3.5 The Repercussions of the Twin Cycles: Basic Tests
The preceding discussion does not shed light on the relative statistical sig-
niﬁcance of the twin cycles. To address that issue, we next run a variety of
simple regressions that attempt to explain capital ﬂows and growth in emerg-
ing markets through developments in the developed economies, particularly
the United States. Our sample spans the period 1970–99 for all regions.
In examining real private ﬂows to all emerging-market economies, we use
four diﬀerent measures of real private capital ﬂows: net capital ﬂows, net di-
rect investment, net portfolio ﬂows, and other capital ﬂows. The regressors
in the ﬁrst set of equations are real U.S. GDP growth and the U.S. short-
term nominal interest rate (the yield on the three-month treasury bill). Be-
cause neither of these variables poses a potential endogeneity problem, our
estimation method is simple ordinary least squares. Table 3.7reports the re-
sults of this regression for all emerging market economies; the appendix
reports results for particular regions.
When we examine the results for the emerging market aggregate, as well
as for most of the regional subgroups, U.S. nominal interest rates seem to
play a more dominant and systematic role in explaining capital ﬂows to
emerging markets than does U.S. economic growth. As a general rule, ris-
ing U.S. interest rates are associated with falling capital ﬂows to emerging
markets. In eﬀect, in many of the regressions, the coeﬃcient on growth is
What Hurts Emerging Markets Most? 149negative, suggesting that when the United States is enjoying rapid growth,
capital stays at home. This eﬀect is most pronounced in the category of
other net ﬂows, consisting largely of bank lending. Both FDI ﬂows and
portfolio ﬂows are consistently interest rate–sensitive.15
There are, however, various regional diﬀerences worth highlighting.
First, U.S. nominal interest rates are signiﬁcant in explaining portfolio and
FDI ﬂows in all regions—but the impacts are greatest in the Western Hemi-
sphere and lowest in Africa. This result may simply emphasize that, among
the emerging markets with some access to international capital markets
(Asia and Latin America), the latter are more heavily indebted and inter-
connected with the United States. Second, growth in the United States has
a signiﬁcant and positive inﬂuence in explaining FDI to the Western Hemi-
sphere, which is not the case for other regions. Third, as the descriptive
analysis anticipated, the other capital ﬂow category behaves very diﬀerently
from FDI and portfolio ﬂows.
We next perform a comparable exercise for growth similar to that of
Dornbusch (1985), who focused on the links between developing debtor
countries and their developed counterparts. Dornbusch regressed develop-
ing country GDP growth on a measure of Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) growth and found the coeﬃcient on
the OECD growth measure to be statistically signiﬁcant, in the 0.28–0.76
range.16 More recently, Frankel and Roubini (2000) regressed developing
150 Carmen M. Reinhart and Vincent Raymond Reinhart
15. Similar results obtain when developed-country real GDP growth rates are used in lieu of
the U.S. growth rate, but these results are not reported here due to considerations of space.
16. Dornbusch used industrial production, real GDP growth, and import volume; the
sample was taken from 1961 to 1984.
Table 3.7 Determinants of Real Private Capital Flows to Emerging 
Market Economies
United States
Nominal Real GDP
Type of Capital Flow Constant Interest Rate Growth R2
Net private capital ﬂows 34.21 –2.32 –1.09 0.18
(8.38) (0.96) (1.11)
Net private direct investment 18.80 –1.57 0.26 0.16
(6.61) (0.76) (0.88)
Net private portfolio investment 13.55 –1.26 –0.33 0.19
(4.33) (0.50) (0.57)
Other net private capital ﬂows 2.11 0.50 –1.06 0.09
(6.16) (0.71) (0.82)
Source: Authors’ calculations using International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
(October 2000) and Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report to the President (2001).
Notes: Estimated using annual data from 1970 to 1999. Standard errors are in parentheses.country growth for various regional groupings against the G7 real interest
rate; they found that the coeﬃcients on real interest rates were negative and
in most cases statistically signiﬁcant, with the greatest interest sensitivity in
the Western Hemisphere.17
Our exercise here combines these two approaches. As shown in table 3.8,
when GDP growth for the various country groupings is regressed against
U.S. growth and the short-term real interest rate, the results tend to be quite
intuitive. The sensitivity of growth to U.S. growth is highest (and statistically
signiﬁcant) for the newly industrialized Asian economies, which depend
greatly on trade with the United States, and lowest for the remainder of Asia.
For all developing countries, both of the regressors have the anticipated signs
and are statistically signiﬁcant. A 1 percentage point decline in U.S. growth
rates reduces GDP growth for the developing countries by 0.2 percent, while
a 1 percent increase in U.S. real interest rates reduces it by 0.24 percent. De-
spite strong trade links with the United States for most countries in the re-
gion, U.S. growth is only marginally statistically signiﬁcant for the Western
Hemisphere, although the coeﬃcient is positively signed. U.S. growth is also
signiﬁcant for the Middle East and European developing countries. Given its
history of relatively high levels of indebtedness and periodic debt-servicing
diﬃculties, it is not surprising that the U.S. real interest rate is signiﬁcant and
that growth is most sensitive to interest rate ﬂuctuations in the Western
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Table 3.8 Determinants of Real GDP Growth in Emerging Market Economies
United States
Short Real Real GDP
Region/Country Constant Interest Rate Growth R2
Newly industrialized Asian economies 6.25 –0.21 0.56 0.16
(0.94) (0.23) (0.25)
Developing countries 4.83 –0.24 0.20 0.23
(0.40) (0.10) (0.11)
Africa 2.95 –0.14 0.05 0.03
(0.60) (0.15) (0.16)
Asia 6.30 0.16 0.01 0.04
(0.67) (0.16) (0.18)
Middle East and Europe 3.84 –0.52 0.43 0.17
(1.04) (0.26) (0.28)
Western Hemisphere 3.73 –0.71 0.32 0.43
(0.66) (0.16) (0.17)
Source: Authors’ calculations using International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
(October 2000) and Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report to the President (2001).
Notes: Estimated using annual data from 1970 to 1999. Standard errors are in parentheses.
17. The coeﬃcient for the Western Hemisphere was –0.77, compared to –0.39 for all market
borrowers.Hemisphere; the coeﬃcient (–0.71) is almost four times as large, in absolute
terms, as for all developing countries. Indeed, one cannot reject the hypoth-
esis that a 1 percent increase in U.S. real interest rates leads to a 1 percent de-
cline in growth in the region. Real U.S. interest rates are also statistically sig-
niﬁcant for the Middle East and Europe. For countries at the other end of the
spectrum—the newly industrialized Asian economies, with low levels of ex-
ternal debt and considerable access to private capital markets—U.S. interest
rates are not signiﬁcant, although the coeﬃcient has the expected negative
sign. As far as these regressions are concerned, U.S. developments have no
systematic relationship with the rest of developing Asia.18
3.4 The Consequences of Exchange Rate and 
Interest Rate Volatility in the North
To examine the issue of whether the volatility of interest rates and G3
exchange rates has adverse consequences for cross-border capital ﬂows
to emerging markets and growth, we split our sample into high- and low-
volatility periods and conduct a set of exercises comparable to those dis-
cussed in the preceeding section.
3.4.1 Background on Exchange Rate Variability in Emerging Markets
The argument that excessive volatility of G3 exchange rates imposes sig-
niﬁcant costs on emerging markets seems to rely mostly on a spending
channel. A large swing in the dollar’s value on the foreign exchange market
in terms of the yen and the euro translates directly into changes in the com-
petitiveness of countries that link their currencies to the dollar—either
through a hard peg or a highly managed ﬂoat. The evidence in Calvo and
Reinhart (2002) suggests that many developing countries fall into that
group. They report a widespread “fear of ﬂoating,” in that many emerging
market currencies tend to track the dollar or the euro closely, even in cases
that are oﬃcially classiﬁed as ﬂoating.
Some sense of the stakes for emerging-market economies can be had
from ﬁgures 3.4 through 3.6 and table 3.9. We calculated simple annual av-
erages of the absolute value of the monthly changes in the logarithms of the
real deutsche Mark/dollar and real yen/dollar exchange rates from 1970 to
1999, of the percentage point change in the real U.S. treasury bill rate (on
the rationale that most developing country borrowing is denominated in
U.S. dollars) from 1973 to 1999, and of the monthly changes in the loga-
rithm of U.S. real personal consumption expenditure from 1970 to 1999.
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18. An elegant model that broadly supports this pattern of coeﬃcients is provided by Gertler
and Rogoﬀ (1990). They oﬀer a framework in which a country’s level of wealth inﬂuences the
extent of agency problems in lending and, therefore, the degree of integration with the world
capital market. As a general rule in table 3.8, regions with greater per capita wealth tend to be
more tightly linked to U.S. interest rates.F
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.The three ﬁgures split the sample into two states of nature: those in which
G3 exchange rate volatility is above and below the sample median (in ﬁg.
3.4), those in which U.S. interest rate volatility is above and below the
sample median (in ﬁg. 3.5), and those in which the average annual volatility
of U.S. personal consumption expenditure is above and below the median
(in ﬁgure 3.6). As before, we report the volume of real capital ﬂows by coun-
try grouping and type across the sample split. As is evident from ﬁgure 3.4,
the volatility of G3 exchange rates has little discernible eﬀect on net real
private capital ﬂows to emerging-market economies or on any of the major
regions reported. Beneath that total, though, there are important composi-
tional eﬀects, in that both portfolio and other net capital ﬂows step lower
when G3 exchange rate volatility is higher. The unchanged total is due to the
fact that private direct investment moves in the opposite direction: From
1970 to 1999, FDI tended to be higher in those years when G3 exchange rate
volatility was on the high side of the median.
Similar oﬀsetting movements of FDI and portfolio and other capital
ﬂows are evident when the sample is split according to the volatility of the
U.S. short-term real interest rates, as in ﬁgure 3.5. In this case, on net, real
private capital ﬂows are somewhat higher when U.S. rates move more from
month to This follows because the expansion of portfolio and other ﬂows
when interest rates are volatile more than makes up for a contraction in
FDI. Apparently, the short-term ﬁnancial transactions in portfolio and
other ﬂows are energized by interest rate volatility, even as the longer-term
transactions in FDI ﬂag.
The total and major components of private capital ﬂows respond more
similarly when the sample is split according to the volatility of U.S. con-
sumption spending, as seen in ﬁgure 3.6. Relatively stable personal con-
sumption expenditure (PCE) growth in the United States is associated with
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Table 3.9 Volatility and Foreign Real GDP Growth: Annual Rate (%), 1970–99
Degree of U.S.
Consumption 
Volatility
Degree of
G3 Currency 
Volatility
Degree of 
U.S. Rate
Volatility
Region/Country High Low High Low High Low
Newly industrialized 
Asian economies 7.95 7.02 6.96 8.49 8.94 6.23
Developing countries 5.33 4.56 4.68 5.54 5.25 4.88
Africa 2.42 2.75 2.73 3.12 3.44 2.30
Asia 6.53 6.89 6.30 6.87 6.64 6.48
Middle East and Europe 4.33 3.37 3.55 5.42 4.90 3.89
Western Hemisphere 4.90 1.98 3.33 4.09 3.87 3.47
Source: Authors’ calculations using International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (October
2000).
Note: Sample period for U.S. rate volatility is 1973 to 1999.larger capital ﬂows, on net, to emerging market economies, especially those
taking the form of foreign direct and portfolio investment. To an important
extent, this may be due to the combination of a secular decline in U.S. con-
sumption volatility and a secular increase in the volume of capital ﬂows.
Simply, low–consumption volatility years predominate later in the sample,
when capital ﬂows are also larger.19
Table 3.9 reports the average annual growth rates of real GDP in devel-
oping countries for diﬀerent splits of the data determined by the volatili-
ties, in turn, of G3 exchange rates, U.S. interest rates, and U.S. consumption.
As a general rule, neither G3 exchange rate volatility nor U.S. consump-
tion volatility appears harmful to growth prospects in emerging market
economies. In both cuts of the data, high volatility is associated with about
1⁄2 to 3⁄4 percentage point faster growth in developing countries, as we see
when comparing columns (1) and (2) for G3 exchange rates or columns (5)
and (6) for U.S. consumption. For some regions, particularly newly indus-
trialized Asian economies, the diﬀerence is quite large. What is also appar-
ent is that U.S. short-term interest rates, on average, are linked to slower
economic growth in the developing world, with diﬀerences in growth across
the two regimes ranging from 3/8 to nearly 2 percentage points.
The insight that emerges from the simple model is that enforcing target
zones in the G3 currencies involves choosing a point along the trade-oﬀbe-
tween lower exchange rate volatility and higher interest rate volatility.
Moreover, to the extent that G3 spending is sensitive to interest rates, there
will be a corresponding trade-oﬀbetween lower exchange rate volatility and
higher consumption volatility. We parsed our sample along the dimensions
of that trade-oﬀ, examining capital ﬂows and GDP growth according to the
joint behavior of the relevant volatilities. Table 3.10 records those results.
From an emerging-market perspective, G3 target zones imply moving from
the upper right cell of each panel, where G3 currency volatility is high but
U.S. interest rate of PCE volatility is low, to the lower left cell, where G3 cur-
rency volatility is low but U.S. interest rate or PCE volatility is high.
With regard to the upper four panels of the table looking at the comove-
ment of G3 exchange rate and U.S. interest rate volatility, net private capi-
tal ﬂows were almost $5 billion higher, on average, in those years in which
G3 exchange rates were not volatile and U.S. interest rates were. However,
by considering the minor diagonals on the other three panels, it become
clear that this is the case because a sizable decline in FDI across the two pe-
riods was oﬀset by increases in hotter-money ﬂows—portfolio investment
and other private ﬂows. Moreover, it would have been unwise in emerging-
market economies over the past twenty-seven years to trade times when G3
exchange rates were volatile but U.S. PCE growth was stable for times when
G3 exchange rates were stable but U.S. PCE growth was volatile. Across the
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19. Two-thirds of the observations on PCE variability in the ﬁrst half of the sample lie above
the median calculated over the entire sample.bottom four panels of table 3.10, real private ﬂows uniformly fall as they
move from the upper right cell to the bottom right cell. Taken together, the
results given in table 3.10 provide no evidence that the ﬂow of private capi-
tal to emerging market economies would beneﬁt from a G3 target zone.
However, attracting ﬁnancial capital is only an intermediate goal relative
to the ultimate responsibility of national authorities to foster economic
growth. Table 3.11 presents averages of real GDP growth from 1973 to 1999
for major country groups split according to the joint behavior of G3 ex-
change rates and either U.S. interest rates or PCE. Here, the evidence does
suggest that trading higher for lower G3 exchange rate volatility, even at the
cost of more volatility in either U.S. interest rates or consumption, would
beneﬁt growth.
Table 3.12 addresses the possibility of nonlinearities in the responses of
developing countries by using an indicator approach. In the two left panels,
data on the number of currency crises in developing countries by year (out
of the total number of years) are sorted according to G3 exchange rate, U.S.
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Table 3.10 Net Private Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies and 
G3 Volatilities
Condition of G3
Currency Volatility
Source of Capital U.S. Volatilitya Low High
U.S. Interest Rate and G3 Exchange Rate Volatilities
Net private capital ﬂows Low 13.44 15.01
High 19.91 14.85
Net private portfolio investment Low 5.09 3.01
High 9.03 1.39
Net private direct investment Low 10.01 14.83
High 7.68 4.25
Other net private capital ﬂows Low –1.65 –2.83
High 3.19 9.21
U.S. PCE and G3 Exchange Rate Volatilities
Net private capital ﬂows Low 28.46 16.20
High 4.47 13.70
Net private portfolio investment Low 13.50 2.76
High 0.51 2.04
Net private direct investment Low 13.02 12.00
High 3.14 9.74
Other net private capital ﬂows Low 1.94 1.44
High 0.82 1.93
Source: Authors’ calculations using International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
(October 2000).
Note: Average, billions $1970, 1973 to 1999.
aColumn refers to U.S. rate volatility in ﬁrst half of table and to PCE volatility in second half
of table.Table 3.12 Likelihood of the Twin Crises and G3 Volatilities
Condition of G3 
Currency Volatility
Type of Crises U.S. Volatility Low High
Currency crises Lowa 0.10 0.25
Higha 0.10 0.10
Banking crises Lowa 0.05 0.20
Higha 0.10 0.15
Currency crises Lowb 0.10 0.25
Highb 0.10 0.10
Banking crises Lowb 0.10 0.20
Highb 0.05 0.15
Source: Authors’ calculations using International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
(October 2000).
Note: Percent of the sample of above-the-median crises, 1980 to 1998.
aColumn refers to U.S. rate volatility.
bColumn refers to U.S. PCE volatility.
Table 3.11 Real GDP Growth in Emerging Market Economies and G3 Volatilities
Condition of G3
Currency Volatility
Region U.S. Volatilitya Low High
U.S. Interest Rate and G3 Exchange Rate Volatilities
Newly industrialized Asian economies Low 8.46 6.44
High 8.06 7.83
Asia Low 8.10 6.41
High 6.89 6.12
Developing countries Low 4.93 4.42
High 5.51 5.11
Western Hemisphere Low 9.04 9.93
High 7.37 6.20
U.S. PCE and G3 Exchange Rate Volatilities
Newly industrialized Asian economies Low 7.44 5.32
High 9.13 8.60
Asia Low 7.91 5.41
High 6.63 7.19
Developing countries Low 5.92 4.10
High 4.56 5.25
Western Hemisphere Low 6.08 6.04
High 4.51 5.44
Source: Authors’ calculations using International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
(October 2000).
Note: Average annual rate, percent, 1973 to 1999.
aColumn refers to U.S. rate volatility in ﬁrst half of table and to U.S. PCE volatility in second
half of table.interest rate, and PCE volatility (with the crisis indicator deﬁned according
to the methodology in Frankel and Rose 1996, as recently updated and ex-
tended to a larger country set by Reinhart 2000).20 The right panels report
similar calculations using the number of banking crises from the same
source. As can be seen along the minor diagonals of the four panels, years
in which G3 exchange rate volatility was above its median and interest rate
volatility in the United States was below its median over the past eighteen
years were associated with relatively more crises in developing countries, es-
pecially compared to those years when G3 currency volatility was low but
U.S. interest rate volatility was high. In that sense, advocates of target zones
are correct in noting that crises are more frequent when G3 exchange rates
are more volatile. Moreover, that historical record suggests that the situa-
tion can be improved upon by reducing that volatility by incurring more in-
terest rate of PCE volatility in the United States.
3.4.2 Basic Tests
The diﬃculty in interpreting these data, whether on capital ﬂows or GDP
growth, is that some of the regularities observed in moving between the cells
of these contingency tables may result from systematic macroeconomic
changes rather than unique eﬀects from the various volatilities. However,
in an earlier section, we oﬀered a simple regression that helped to explain
emerging-market economies’ capital ﬂows and GDP growth using variables
that could be treated as exogenous to the South–U.S. interest rates and eco-
nomic growth. We now ask whether G3 indicator variables have any ability
to explain the residuals to those “fundamental” regressions, and thereby
put conﬁdence bands about the estimates of the eﬀects of interest rate and
exchange rate volatility on capital ﬂows and GDP growth.
Each block of table 3.13corresponds to a speciﬁcation in which the resid-
ual from the equation explaining the capital ﬂow concept in the column
head is regressed against two G3 dummies (with no constant terms, as the
dummies are exhaustive). Those dummies are the same we have used to split
the data in the various exercises already reported and capture the U.S. busi-
ness cycle; U.S. monetary policy; the volatilities of U.S. real short-term rates,
G3 exchange rates, and U.S. consumption growth; currency crises; and
banking crises.21 In general, a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient would indi-
cate that a G3 factor exerted an additional inﬂuence beyond that contained
in U.S. interest rates and income. As to G3 target zones in particular, there
appears to be no signiﬁcant eﬀect on average of episodes of higher vola-
tilities by either measure for topline net capital ﬂows. Taken literally—
no doubt too literally—this would indicate there is no particular cost to
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20. The results are similar when one employs the methodology of Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999).
21. Thus, there are twenty-eight regressions reported in the table corresponding to four mea-
sures of capital ﬂows and seven diﬀerent sets of states of nature.Table 3.13 Can “Excess” Real Capital Flows Be Explained by G3 Factors?
Net Private Capital Flows
Type of Factor Total Direct Investment Portfolio Other
U.S. business cycle
Expansion 0.44 0.69 0.61 –0.88
(2.72) (2.14) (1.39) (1.98)
Recession –1.03 –1.61 –1.41 2.06
(4.16) (2.14) (2.13) (1.98)
U.S. monetary policy
Tightening –1.78 0.42 –0.44 –1.78
(3.58) (2.85) (1.86) (2.62)
Easing 1.19 –0.28 0.29 1.18
(2.92) (2.32) (1.52) (2.14)
Volatility of U.S. real 
short-term ratesa
High 2.40 –2.53 1.58 3.28
(3.49) (2.51) (1.77) (2.37)
Low 0.02 4.47 –0.18 –4.30
(3.36) (2.42) (1.71) (2.29)
Volatility of G3 
exchange rates
High 0.85 3.04 –0.92 –1.34
(3.11) (2.32) (1.59) (2.27)
Low –0.97 –3.47 1.05 1.53
(3.33) (2.48) (1.70) (2.42)
Volatility of U.S. 
consumption
High –4.93 –3.15 –2.76 1.06
(2.81) (2.31) (1.42) (2.28)
Low 5.63 3.61 3.16 –1.21
(3.00) (2.47) (1.52) (2.44)
Currency crisesb
High 1.44 1.66 3.34 –3.61
(4.37) (2.76) (2.04) (2.55)
Low 5.25 4.22 1.38 –3.61
(5.12) (3.23) (2.39) (2.99)
Banking crisesc
High 2.34 1.99 3.82 –3.55
(4.62) (2.91) (2.11) (2.69)
Low 3.83 3.57 1.07 –0.84
(4.87) (3.07) (2.22) (2.83)
Source: Authors’ calculations using International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
(October 2000) and Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report to the President (2001).
Notes: Relationship of the residual from the capital ﬂow fundamentals equations to G3
dummy variables from 1970 to 1999. Standard errors are in parentheses.
aEstimated from 1973 to 1999.
bEstimated from 1980 to 1998.
cEstimated from 1980 to 1998.making real interest rates more volatile, but there is also no particular bene-
ﬁtin damping G3 exchange rate volatility. This statistical evidence ultimately
diﬀers little from the theoretical analysis; from the perspective of emerging-
market economies, the case for limiting G3 exchange rate volatility is not
proven. A similar analysis across regional aggregates, not included here due
to considerations of space, provides no reason to question that judgment.
We performed a similar exercise to see if episodes of either volatile G3 ex-
change rates or U.S. real interest rates exerted a systematic inﬂuence on the
growth of output in major emerging-market areas. Those results, reported
in table 3.14, tell a similar story. Across the six areas examined, none of the
dummy variables related to the various volatilities diﬀered signiﬁcantly
from zero. Taken together, the evidence suggests that advocates of G3 tar-
get zones have to identify another mechanism by which ﬁnancial market
volatility in the industrial countries impinges on their neighbors to the
South beyond that expected through the ﬂows of trade (with their associ-
ated eﬀects on income) or capital.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have attempted to analyze and quantify how develop-
ments in the exchange rate arrangements of the G3 countries inﬂuence
emerging market economies. The debate on G3 target zones should be placed
in the broader context of the ongoing debate on exchange rate arrangements
in emerging-market economies, which often hinge on credibility. The advo-
cates for dollarization, for instance, argue that a nation with an uneven his-
tory of commitment to low inﬂation can import the reputation of the central
bank of the anchor currency. For the issue at hand, however, there are no ob-
vious bonuses to smaller countries should G3 central banks damp the ﬂuc-
tuations of their currencies—and, as discussed in Rogoﬀ(2001), the beneﬁts
to developed countries are limited at best. This also implies that the direct
beneﬁts to emerging-market economies should stem only from the lessened
volatility of their trade-weighted currencies. However, as Rose (2000) points
out, the beneﬁts of reduced exchange rate variability on trade ﬂows, at least,
are small compared to those of adopting a common currency.
This is also the place to discuss the limitations to our analysis. In partic-
ular, our use of linear, or nearly linear, models may understate the conse-
quences of variability in interest rates and exchange rates. To the extent that
high world interest rates trigger balance sheet problems in emerging mar-
kets, the consequences of the trade-oﬀimplied by a target zone may be con-
siderable. Indeed, one repeated message of this paper is that emerging-mar-
ket economies are diﬀerent from their industrial brethren, having already
surrendered a high degree of autonomy in their monetary policies, often
pricing their goods in foreign—not local—currencies, and being vulnerable
to sudden exclusion from world ﬁnancial markets.
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Newly Middle
Industrialized Developing East and Western
Type of Factor Asia Countries Africa Asia Europe Hemisphere
U.S. business cycle
Expansion 8.24 6.07 2.42 –6.82 –0.23 0.69
(3.02) (2.26) (1.53) (1.97) (0.68) (0.69)
Recession 6.54 –0.17 –0.86 1.46 0.54 0.87
(4.62) (3.45) (2.34) (3.01) (1.04) (1.06)
U.S. monetary policy
Tightening 4.12 4.37 0.29 –7.14 –1.23 –0.47
(3.91) (3.11) (2.06) (2.76) (0.85) (0.87)
Easing 10.14 4.08 2.20 –2.47 0.82 1.55
(3.19) (2.54) (1.68) (2.25) (0.70) (0.71)
Volatility of U.S. 
real short-term 
ratesa
High 9.74 0.66 2.36 –0.30 –0.85 –0.50
(4.01) (2.86) (2.07) (2.51) (0.77) (0.77)
Low 7.06 8.76 0.93 –9.37 –0.26 0.88
(3.87) (2.76) (1.99) (2.42) (0.74) (0.74)
Volatility of G3 
exchange rates
High 7.67 6.03 –0.40 –4.98 –0.34 0.46
(3.47) (2.64) (1.73) (2.46) (0.78) (0.79)
Low 7.80 2.10 3.54 –3.60 0.39 1.05
(3.71) (2.82) (1.84) (2.63) (0.83) (0.85)
Volatility of U.S. 
consumption
High 2.12 1.31 –1.24 –3.83 0.19 0.98
(3.10) (2.57) (1.64) (2.46) (0.78) (0.79)
Low 14.15 7.50 4.50 –4.92 –0.22 0.46
(3.32) (2.75) (1.75) (2.63) (0.84) (0.85)
Currency crisesb
High 6.44 3.83 3.03 –7.35 –0.89 0.09
(4.93) (3.10) (2.49) (2.95) (0.76) (0.83)
Low 15.99 10.33 4.23 –5.47 –0.48 0.40
(5.78) (3.64) (2.92) (3.46) (0.89) (0.97)
Banking crisesc
High 9.30 4.70 4.24 –6.76 –0.71 0.12
(5.39) (3.36) (2.61) (3.11) (0.80) (0.87)
Low 11.75 8.64 2.76 –6.33 –0.73 0.34
(5.68) (3.55) (2.75) (3.28) (0.84) (0.92)
Source: Authors’ calculations using International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (October
2000) and Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report to the President (2001).
Notes: Relationship of the residual from the real GDP growth fundamentals equations to G3 dummy
variables from 1970 to 1999. Standard errors are in parentheses.
aEstimated from 1973 to 1999.
bEstimated from 1980 to 1998.
cEstimated from 1980 to 1998.Appendix
Determinants of Real Private Capital Flows to Emerging
Market Economies
United States
Region/Country Nominal Interest Rate Real GDP R2
Africa
Net private capital ﬂows 0.21 0.04 0.06
(0.17) (0.19)
Net private direct investment –0.07 0.00 0.15
(0.03) (0.04)
Net private portfolio investment –0.09 0.04 0.21
(0.04) (0.05)
Other net private capital ﬂows 0.37 0.00 0.15
(0.18) (0.20)
Asia and crisis countries
Net private capital ﬂows 0.05 –0.42 0.05
(0.34) (0.39)
Net private direct investment –0.12 –0.02 0.15
(0.06) (0.06)
Net private portfolio investment –0.25 –0.05 0.13
(0.13) (0.15)
Other net private capital ﬂows 0.43 –0.35 0.18
(0.25) (0.29)
Other Asian emerging markets
Net private capital ﬂows –0.26 –0.06 0.03
(0.27) (0.31)
Net private direct investment –0.64 0.07 0.19
(0.27) (0.31)
Net private portfolio investment –0.04 –0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.06)
Other net private capital ﬂows 0.42 –0.09 0.11
(0.25) (0.28)
Middle East and Europe
Net private capital ﬂows –1.68 –0.25 0.33
(0.46) (0.54)
Net private direct investment –0.08 0.08 0.11
(0.07) (0.08)
Net private portfolio investment 0.02 –0.06 0.01
(0.12) (0.14)
Other net private capital ﬂows –1.63 –0.27 0.39
(0.40) (0.46)
Western Hemisphere
Net private capital ﬂows 0.04 –0.29 0.01
(0.47) (0.54)
Net private direct investment –0.41 0.10 0.09
(0.27) (0.32)
Net private portfolio investment –0.73 –0.21 0.20
(0.28) (0.32)
Other net private capital ﬂows 1.18 –0.21 0.27
(0.40) (0.46)
Source: Authors’ calculations using International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (October
2000) and Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report to the President (2001).
Note: Estimated using annual data from 1970 to 1999. Standard errors are in parentheses.References
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Comment Joshua Aizenman
This interesting paper investigates an issue of great importance to emerging
markets—the welfare eﬀect of attempts to reduce the exchange rate volatil-
ity among the G3 currencies. My discussion will start with an overview of
the main message of the paper and will conclude with several remarks re-
garding the robustness of the arguments advanced in it.
Overview
The Goal
The purpose of the paper is to examine the welfare eﬀect, from an emerg-
ing-market perspective, of reducing the G3 currencies’ variability. It ex-
plores the various channels of North-South transmission and analyzes the
link between the G3 exchange rate and interest rate volatility, and economic
growth in developing countries.
The Background
Using target zones as a mechanism for reducing the volatility of the G3
currencies has been advocated by various economists, including McKin-
non, Williamson, Clarida, and others. These proposals focused mostly on
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Little attention was given to the implications of adopting the target zone
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a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.regime on the welfare of the emerging markets. This issue may be of special
relevance as many developing countries tie their currency to that of one of
the G3 countries, frequently to the U.S. dollar, as a manifestation of the
“fear of ﬂoating” (see Calvo and Reinhart 2000).
The Main Argument
The authors are skeptical regarding the ultimate welfare gains from sta-
bilizing the G3 currencies. They assert that lower volatility of the G3 cur-
rencies would ultimately lead to higher interest rate volatility. They observe
that sterilized intervention does not work and that restricting capital mo-
bility is against the consensus. Hence, the authors conclude that the inter-
est rate adjustment will replace exchange rate adjustment. The welfare con-
sequences of these changes are ambiguous—higher interest rate volatility
would be costly to emerging markets (EMs), and these costs may exceed the
beneﬁts from more stable G3 currencies.
This argument is illustrated in ﬁgure 3C.1. The authors presume the pres-
ence of a concave association between the exchange rate and the emerging
markets’ output. Similarly, the association between the G3 interest rate and
the emerging markets’ output is concave. This in turn would imply that sta-
bilizing the G3 currencies would increase the emerging markets’ expected
GDP and welfare, as is illustrated in panel A. However, the resultant greater
volatility of the interest rate would reduce the emerging markets’ expected
GDP and welfare (see panel B). The net balance would be determined by
the relative strength of these two conﬂicting eﬀects.
In section 3.4 the authors review in detail the linkages between the G3 and
EM. Among their interesting ﬁndings, they report that economic growth in
developing countries tends to be faster against the backdrop of a more stable
U.S. short-term interest rate. Speciﬁcally, EMGrowth (volatile G3 E. rates  
stable iU.S.) – EMGrowth (volatile iU.S.  stable G3 E. rates)  %1.25. This ob-
servation induces them to conclude that there is no natural presumption that
the emerging markets would beneﬁt from stabilizing the G3 currencies.
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Fig. 3C.1 A, Expected output and exchange rate volatility; B, Expected output and
interest rate volatilityResponse
Is There a Trade-Oﬀ Between Interest Rate Volatility 
and Exchange Rate Volatility for the G3?
The logic of the paper presumes the existence of a trade-oﬀ between in-
terest rate and exchange rate volatility for the G3. With such a trade-oﬀ, ﬁg-
ure 3C.1 illustrates the ambiguity of the welfare eﬀects attributed to greater
exchange rate stability. However, no evidence is presented to support this
presumption. The existing literature provides us with little guidance regard-
ing this issue. In fact, several contributions are skeptical about this trade-oﬀ.
For example, Flood and Rose (1995) failed to ﬁnd such a trade-oﬀ, report-
ing, “The graphs indicate that there is no substantial tradeoﬀ between ex-
change rate volatility and the volatility of (domestic) interest rate” (Flood
and Rose 1995, 17). A recent update of this study is summarized by Jeanne
and Rose (1999), who found that macroeconomic fundamentals do not ex-
hibit regime-varying volatility. These authors advance a possible interpreta-
tion for these ﬁndings, focusing on the impact of the entry of noise traders to
the market. Accordingly, a pure ﬂoat with an endogenous number of noise
traders may give rise to multiple equilibria. The same macrofundamentals
are consistent with low exchange rate volatility and a low number of noise
traders, or high exchange rate volatility and a high number of noise traders.
The multiplicity follows from the observation that noise traders aﬀect the al-
location of risk in two ways—they create risk, and they allow for deeper risk
sharing. The ultimate impact of the entry of noise traders on the risk pre-
mium is ambiguous. Jeanne and Rose illustrate that for certain conﬁgura-
tions in which two equilibria exist, the ineﬃcient one is associated with high
exchange rate volatility. In that equilibrium, all noise traders are active. Their
model provides a nice setup for the multiple equilibrium hypothesis (Eichen-
green and Wyplosz 1993). In such an economy, a target zone may eliminate
the ineﬃcient equilibrium by restricting the feasible range of exchange rate
volatility. In this case there is a “free lunch,” in the sense that there is no
trade-oﬀ between exchange rate volatility and interest rate volatility—the
good equilibrium is associated with lower exchange rate volatility as well as
with a lower risk premium and lower interest rate volatility.
This argument may be restated in terms of the earlier literature dealing
with exchange rate regimes. If most of the shocks are nominal (as will be the
case, for example, with an unstable demand for money), greater ﬁxity of the
exchange rate may be associated with lower interest rate volatility, if the
supply of money was allowed to adjust to the shocks aﬀecting the demand
for money.
Interpreting the Empirical Facts
The empirical discussion dealing with the interest rate–monetary policy
cycle is very interesting and illuminating. The results dealing with the as-
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leave one in doubt. The methodology of comparing the flows of capital
and the GDP between periods of relatively stable and unstable interest and
exchange rates is useful in motivating the welfare questions, yet it does not
allow one to fully assess the impact of policies. Specifically, there are no
controls for “level” variables that may explain the capital flows and the
GDP. Without controlling for all the level variables that may account for
capital flows and the GDP, little can be inferred about the pure eﬀect of
volatility.
On the Association between Exchange Rate Volatility 
and the Gross Domestic Product
The presumption of the paper about the negative eﬀect of exchange rate
volatility on the gross domestic product (GDP) has been subject to recent de-
bate. The earlier Flood and Rose (1995) contribution found a weak trade-oﬀ
between exchange rate and output volatility. Recently, however, Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger (2001) report that for developing countries, less ﬂexible ex-
change rate regimes are strongly associated with both slower growth and
greater output volatility. For industrial countries, diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes do not appear to have any signiﬁcant impact on growth.
To sum up, this paper is an interesting contribution. It raises several im-
portant questions, cautioning us that the welfare eﬀects of attempts to sta-
bilize the G3 on the emerging markets are ambiguous. Resolving these
ambiguities requires further investigation.
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Discussion Summary
Michael P. Dooley remarked that there is no convincing empirical evidence
for the existence of a trade-oﬀ between interest rate and exchange rate
volatility and gave support to the authors’ view that monetary policy would
be the only tool for supporting a G3 target zone.
What Hurts Emerging Markets Most? 169Richard Portes made reference to “the balloon analogy” for describing
the volatility trade-oﬀ. He questioned the paper’s dismissal of sterilized in-
tervention as a way of enforcing a target zone and pointed to empirical ev-
idence suggesting that foreign exchange intervention may be eﬀective, at
least over certain periods of time.
Robert Flood pointed to the asymmetries of crisis models data and em-
phasized the importance of unconstrained estimation in order to take ac-
count of skewness in the data.
Jeﬀrey Shafer made a reference to the European economies during the
1980s and argued that there is no observed trade-oﬀ between exchange rate
and interest rate volatility. He questioned, however, whether soft target
zones as opposed to ﬁxed rates would be suﬃcient to meet the goals of a G3
target zone.
Morris Goldsteinmade a reference to earlier literature and noted that bet-
ter bottom-line growth and inﬂation performance is not a likely outcome of
target zones. Thus, the G3 countries would be unwilling to enter such an ex-
change rate arrangement, and even if they did, weaker G3 economic per-
formance would not be of any help to emerging market economies.
Andrew Rose remarked that no exchange rate model seems to work well,
at least not in the short run, and, therefore, even though a trade-oﬀbetween
exchange rates and interest rates seems to exist, this trade-oﬀ is hard to
quantify. Martin Eichenbaum pointed out that as long as there is no clear
understanding of what drives exchange rates, the idea of using monetary
policy as a tool for steering exchange rates seems problematic. Dooley
noted that doing nothing because of the lack of consensus regarding the
“right” exchange rate model seems problematic as well.
Jeﬀrey A. Frankel noted that exchange rates are not always tightly linked
to fundamentals and that sterilized intervention has been eﬀective in the
past. However, he added, it would be impossible to commit persistent in-
tervention to maintain a target zone goal since a key element for eﬀective
sterilized intervention is sparing use of the intervention tool.
Vincent Raymond Reinhart remarked that he was sympathetic to the
point made by Dooley regarding the lack of empirical evidence for a trade-
oﬀ between exchange rates and interest rates and agreed that the assertion
of such a trade-oﬀ is the weak part of the paper. He noted, in response to
Goldstein, that the authors had avoided references to earlier literature,
given that the focus of the paper is on emerging market economies. He re-
marked that even though it is indeed possible to achieve an anchoring of
exchange rate expectations under various regimes, the necessary element is
credibility; that is, the imposition of a target zone itself is not suﬃcient.
With respect to the issue of the eﬀectiveness of sterilized foreign exchange
intervention, Reinhart noted that it is important to distinguish between
eﬀectiveness during regimes and eﬀectiveness during episodes. 
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